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Abstract
This paper studies the equilibrium behavior of customers in the Geo/Geo/1 queueing
system with multiple working vacations. The arriving customers decide whether to join
or to balk the queueing systems based on the information of the queue length and the
states of the server. In observable queues, partially observable queues and unobservable
queues three cases we obtain the equilibrium balking strategies based on the reward-cost
structure and socially optimal strategies for all customers. Furthermore, we present some
numerical experiments to illustrate the effect of the information level on the equilibrium
behavior and to compare the customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal strategies.
Keywords:
Geo/Geo/1 queue, Multiple working vacations, Equilibrium balking strategies, Socially
optimal strategies
1. Introduction
Due to important applications in the fields of computer networks, communications
systems and production management, economic queueing systems have received compre-
hensive attention. Recently, based on different queueing models to study the customers’
decisions that whether to join or to balk the queueing systems have became a new hot
spot. Such an economic analysis of queueing systems was pioneered by Naor [1], who
studied the equilibrium and socially optimal strategies in an M/M/1 queue with a simple
linear reward-cost structure. On Naor’s model, arriving customers were informed about
the queue length before they made decisions. Edelson and Hildeband [2] considered the
unobservable case in which the customers made their decisions without being informed
about the state of the queue. Subsequently, Naor’s model and results had been extended
in several literatures, see e.g. [3–5]. Larsen [6] promoted a more generalized model as-
suming that customers’ service values were a set of random variables instead of fixed
constants. Chen and Frank [7] spreaded Naor’s model assuming that both the customers
and the server maximize their expected discounted utility using a common discount rate.
Mandelbaum and Shimkin [8], Shimkin and Mandelbaum [9] respectively discussed the
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equilibrium conditions when the expenditure functions were linear and non-linear in non-
visual systems. The fundamental results on this subject in both the observable and
unobservable queueing systems can be found in the comprehensive monographs of Hassin
and Haviv [10].
Discrete-time queueing systems with vacations have been widely researched by a lot
of investigators because of their extensively applications in manufacturing and telecom-
munication systems. An excellent and complete study on discrete-time queueing systems
with vacations had been presented by Takagi [11]. Zhang and Tian [12] presented the
detailed analysis on the Geo/G/1 queue with multiple adaptive vacations. Moreover,
Goswami and Mund [13] analyzed a finite-buffer renewal input single server discrete-time
GI/Geo/1/N queue with multiple working vacations. Recently, Vijaya Laxmi and Seleshi
[14] investigated a discrete-time renewal input queue with change over times and Bernoulli
schedule vacation interruption under batch service (a, c, b) policy.
The study about the equilibrium customer behavior in vacation queue models, the
first was presented by Burnetas and Economou [15], who explored both the observable
and unobservable conditions in a single server Markovian queue with setup times. Then,
Economou and Kanta [16] examined the equilibrium balking strategies and pricing for
the single server Markovian queue with compartmented waiting space. Guo et al. [17]
considered customer equilibrium and socially optimal strategies to join a queue with only
partial information on the service time distribution such as moments and the range. Liu
et al. [18] researched the equilibrium threshold strategies in observable queueing systems
under single vacation policy. Sun et al. [19] further studied the customers’ equilibrium
and socially optimal joining-balking behavior in theM/M/1 queue with multiple working
vacations. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, researches for the equilibrium
strategies in the discrete-time queueing systems with multiple working vacations haven’t
been given.
In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium joining/balking behavior of the customers
in the discrete-time Geo/Geo/1 queueing system with multiple working vacations. The
server takes the original work at the lower rate rather than completely stopping during the
working vacation period. We will explore the equilibrium strategies for customers’ deci-
sions that whether to join or to balk the queueing systems based on different information
upon arrival. Three cases will be considered: (1) Observable case: arriving customers are
informed about both the states of the server and the number of customers in the system;
(2) Partially observable case: arriving customers are informed only about the states of the
server; (3) Unobservable case: arriving customers are informed about neither the states
of the server nor the number of customers in the system. In the three cases we study the
equilibrium strategies based on the reward-cost structure and socially optimal strategies
for all customers. Subsequently, we present some numerical experiments to research the
effect of the information level on the equilibrium behavior and to compare the customers’
equilibrium and socially optimal strategies.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the queueing model.
In Sections 3, 4, and 5, we respectively study the observable queues, the partially ob-
servable queues and the unobservable queues by using the equilibrium threshold strate-
gies and present some numerical examples to explain the effect of the information level
on customers’ behavior and to compare the customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal
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strategies. In Section 6, the conclusions are given.
2. Description of the model
Geo/Geo/1 queueing system with multiple working vacations can be described as
follows. Throughout this paper, for any real number x ∈ [0, 1], we denote x¯ = 1− x.
(1) Potential customer arrivals occur at the end of slot (n−, n). The inter-arrival times are
independent and identically distributed sequences which follow a geometric distribution
with rate p, 0 < p < 1,
P (T = k) = pp¯k−1, k ≥ 1.
(2) The beginning and ending of the service take place at slot division point t = n,
n = 0, 1, 2, .... The regular service times are independent each other and geometrically
distributed with rate µb, 0 < µb < 1,
P (Sb = k) = µbµ¯
k−1
b , k ≥ 1.
In a working vacation period, the service times are independent each other and geomet-
rically distributed with rate µν , 0 < µν < 1,
P (Sν = k) = µνµ¯
k−1
ν , k ≥ 1.
(3) When the queue becomes empty, the server enters a working vacation period. The
working vacation time V follows a geometric distribution with parameter θ, 0 < θ < 1,
P (V = k) = θθ¯k−1, k ≥ 1.
During a working vacation arriving customers are served according to arrival order by the
rate µν. When a working vacation ends, if there are customers in the queue, the server
switches the service rate from µν to µb, and a regular busy period begins. Otherwise,
the server keeps on another working vacation. Suppose that the beginning and ending of
vacations occur at the end of slot (n−, n).
(4) Assume that inter-arrival times, service times and working vacation times are mutually
independent. The queueing system follows the First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) service
discipline.
Let L+n be the number of customers in the system at time n
+. According to the above
description, a customer who completes service and leaves at (n, n+) no longer be included
in L+n . Define
Jn =
{
0, the system is in a working vacation period at time n+,
1, the system is in a regular busy period at time n+.
It is easy to get that {(L+n , Jn), n > 0} is a Markov chain with state space
Ω = {(0, 0)}
⋃
{(k, j) : k > 1, j = 0, 1}.
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We investigate customer equilibrium strategies for joining/balking. We distinguish
three cases with respect to the level of information available to customers at their arrival
instants, before their decisions are made: the observable case means customers can observe
both Jn and L
+
n ; the partially observable case means customers can observe Jn but not
L+n ; the unobservable case means customers can observe neither Jn nor L
+
n .
Our interest is the behavior of the customers when they decide whether to join or to
balk upon their arrival. To model the decision process, we assume that every customer
receives a reward of R units after service completion. It may reflect a customer’s sat-
isfaction and the added value of being served. Moreover, there exists a waiting cost of
C units per time unit that a customer remains in the system (in queue and in service
area). In this paper, we use a linear cost function, then a customer’s expected net benefit
after service completion, denoted by U , is U = R − CE[W ], where E[W ] represents the
customer’s mean sojourn time in the queueing system. We can get that if the customer
selects balking, U = 0.
3. The observable queues
We first consider the observable case in which the arriving customers can observe both
the state Jn of the server and the number of customers L
+
n in the system. We need to
use equilibrium strategies of thresholds type. In the observable queues, a pure threshold
strategy is specified by a pair (ne(0), ne(1)) and has the form ‘observe (L
+
n , Jn) at arrival
instant; enter if L+n ≤ ne(Jn) and balk otherwise’.
As for the mean sojourn time of a customer who joins the system at state (n, 1), n ≥ 1,
we need to consider as follows. Assume that a new arrival occurs at (n−, n), it is possible
that a service is ending. So the sojourn time equals n service times with probability µb
and equals n + 1 service times with probability µ¯b. We get the probability generating
function (PGF) of the sojourn time of a customer who joins the system at state (n, 1),
denoted by W˜ ∗1 (z).
W˜ ∗1 (z) = µb
(
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)n
+ µ¯b
(
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)n+1
=
µb
1− µ¯bz
(
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)n
.
Then the mean sojourn time of a customer who joins the system at state J = 1 is
E[W (1)] = W˜ ∗
′
1 (z)|z=1 =
n + 1
µb
− 1.
As for the mean sojourn time of a customer who joins the system at state (n, 0), n ≥ 0,
we need to consider two situations. Denote S
(j)
ν the sum of j service times Sν , S
(n)
ν (z|S
(n)
ν ≤
V ) the PGF of S
(n)
ν under the condition S
(n)
ν ≤ V and V (z|S
(j)
ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν ) the PGF of
V under the condition S
(j)
ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν . One situation is that when a new arrival occurs
at (n−, n), there is a customer leaving the system after service completion at the instant
t = n. The probability of this event is equal to µν . Then there are two cases. Case 1: if
there are j customer service completions when the working vacation ends, 0 6 j 6 n− 1,
the sojourn time is the sum of the residual working vacation time under the condition
S
(j)
ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν plus n − j service times with rate µb. Case 2: if at least n customers
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are served when the working vacation ends, the sojourn time is n service times with rate
µν under the condition V > S
(n)
ν . Another situation is that an arrival occurs at (n−, n),
no customer is about to leave at the instant t = n. The probability of this event is equal
to µ¯ν. There are still two cases and are similar to the above. So we get the PGF of the
sojourn time of a customer who joins the system at state (n, 0), denoted by W˜ ∗0 (z).
W˜ ∗0 (z) = µν
[
P (S(n)ν ≤ V )S
(n)
ν (z|S
(n)
ν ≤ V )
+
n−1∑
j=0
P (S(j)ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν )V (z|S
(j)
ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν )
(
µb
1− µ¯bz
)n−j]
+ µ¯ν
[
P (S(n+1)ν ≤ V )S
(n+1)
ν (z|S
(n+1)
ν ≤ V )
+
n∑
j=0
P (S(j)ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν )V (z|S
(j)
ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν )
(
µb
1− µ¯bz
)n+1−j]
+ P (S(1)ν ≤ V )S
(1)
ν (z|S
(1)
ν ≤ V ) + P (S
(0)
ν ≤ V < S
(1)
ν )V (z|S
(0)
ν ≤ V < S
(1)
ν )
µb
1− µ¯bz
= µν
[(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)n
+
n−1∑
j=0
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)j (
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)n−j]
+ µ¯ν
[(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)n+1
+
n∑
j=0
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)j (
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)n+1−j]
+
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
+
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
µbz
1− µ¯bz
=
µν
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)n(
1−
θµb
µb(1− µ¯ν θ¯z)− µν θ¯(1− µ¯bz)
)
+
θµb
µb(1− µ¯ν θ¯z)− µν θ¯(1− µ¯bz)
(
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)n(
µν +
µ¯νµbz
1− µ¯bz
)
+
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
+
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
µbz
1− µ¯bz
.
Then the mean sojourn time of a customer who joins the system at state J = 0 is
E[W (0)] = W˜ ∗
′
0 (z)|z=1 =
n + 1
µb
− 1 +
µb − µν
θµb
[
1−
(
µν − µνθ
θ + µν − θµν
)n+1]
+
θ + µb − θµb
µb(θ + µν − θµν)
.
Hence, the expected net benefit of the customer who joins the queueing system is given
by
U(0) = R− CE[W (0)]
= R− C
{
n + 1
µb
− 1 +
µb − µν
θµb
[
1−
(
µν − µνθ
θ + µν − θµν
)n+1]
+
θ + µb − θµb
µb(θ + µν − θµν)
}
,
U(1) = R− CE[W (1)] = R− C
(
n + 1
µb
− 1
)
.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium thresholds for the observable systems with R = 10, C = 1, µν = 0.4, θ = 0.2
Figure 2: Transition rate diagram for the observable queues
Solving U(0) = 0 and U(1) = 0, we obtain the positive and feasible roots (n∗e(0), n
∗
e(1)).
Because the uniqueness of the roots in the observable case, we present a set of numerical
experiments to show the effect of the information level. We get that the customers’
equilibrium threshold strategy is (ne(0), ne(1)) = (⌊n
∗
e(0)⌋, ⌊n
∗
e(1)⌋) in the observable case.
From the Figure 1 we can obtain that ne(0) and ne(1) both increase with respect to µb,
however, ne(1) increases faster than ne(0).
Now we consider the stationary distribution in the observable case. If all customers
follow the threshold strategy (ne(0), ne(1)), the queueing system conforms a Markov chain
with state space Ωob = {(n, 0)|0 ≤ n ≤ ne(0) + 1}
⋃
{(n, 1)|1 ≤ n ≤ ne(1) + 1}. The
transition rate diagram is depicted in Figure 2.
Using the lexicographical ordering for the states, the transition probability matrix can
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be written as:
P˜ =

0 1 · · · · · · ne(0) ne(0)+1 · · · · · · · · · · · · ne(1)+1
0 A0 C0
1 B0 A1 C1
... B1 A1 C1
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
ne(0) B1 A1 C1
ne(0)+1 B2 A2 C2
... B3 A3 C3
... B4 A3 C3
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
... B4 A3 C3
ne(1)+1 B5 A4

,
where
A0 = p¯, C0 = [pθ¯, pθ], B0 =
[
p¯µν
p¯µb
]
, B1 =
[
p¯θ¯µν p¯θµν
0 p¯µb
]
,
A1 =
[
θ¯(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν) θ(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν)
0 1− pµ¯b − p¯µb
]
, C1 =
[
pθ¯µ¯ν pθµ¯ν
0 pµ¯b
]
,
B2 =
[
θ¯µν θµν
0 p¯µb
]
, A2 =
[
θ¯µ¯ν θµ¯ν
0 1− pµ¯b − p¯µb
]
, C2 =
[
0
pµ¯b
]
,
B3 = [0, p¯µb], A3 = 1− pµ¯b − p¯µb, C3 = pµ¯b, B4 = p¯µb, B5 = µb, A4 = µ¯b.
Let (L+, J) be the stationary limit of (L+n , Jn) and the stationary distribution in the
observable case is denoted as
pi+nj = P{L
+ = n, J = j}, (n, j) ∈ Ωob.
pin =

pi+00, n = 0,
(pi+n0, pi
+
n1), 1 ≤ n ≤ ne(0) + 1,
pi+n1, ne(0) + 2 ≤ n ≤ ne(1) + 1.
pi = (pi0, pi1, ..., pine(1)+1).
So the stationary transition probability equations can be written as
pi+00 = p¯pi
+
00 + p¯µνpi
+
10 + p¯µbpi
+
11, (3.1)
pi+10 = pθ¯pi
+
00 + θ¯(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν)pi
+
10 + θ¯p¯µνpi
+
20, (3.2)
pi+n0 = θ¯pµ¯νpi
+
n−1,0 + θ¯(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν)pi
+
n0 + θ¯p¯µνpi
+
n+1,0, n = 2, ..., ne(0)− 1, (3.3)
pi+
ne(0),0
= θ¯pµ¯νpi
+
ne(0)−1,0
+ θ¯(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν)pi
+
ne(0),0
+ θ¯µνpi
+
ne(0)+1,0
, (3.4)
pi+
ne(0)+1,0
= pθ¯µ¯νpi
+
ne(0),0
+ θ¯µ¯νpi
+
ne(0)+1,0
, (3.5)
pi+11 = pθpi
+
00 + θ(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν)pi
+
10 + (1− pµ¯b − p¯µb)pi
+
11 + θp¯µνpi
+
20 + p¯µbpi
+
21, (3.6)
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pi+n1 = θpµ¯νpi
+
n−1,0 + pµ¯bpi
+
n−1,1 + θ(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν)pi
+
n0 + (1− pµ¯b − p¯µb)pi
+
n1 + θp¯µνpi
+
n+1,0
+ p¯µbpi
+
n+1,1, n = 2, ..., ne(0)− 1, (3.7)
pi+
ne(0),1
= θpµ¯νpi
+
ne(0)−1,0
+ pµ¯bpi
+
ne(0)−1,1
+ θ(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν)pi
+
ne(0),0
+ (1− pµ¯b − p¯µb)pi
+
ne(0),1
+ θµνpi
+
ne(0)+1,0
+ p¯µbpi
+
ne(0)+1,1
, (3.8)
pi+
ne(0)+1,1
= pµ¯bpi
+
ne(0),1
+ p¯µbpi
+
ne(0)+2,1
+ (1− pµ¯b − p¯µb)pi
+
ne(0)+1,1
+ θµ¯νpi
+
ne(0)+1,0
+ pθµ¯νpi
+
ne(0),0
, (3.9)
pi+n1 = pµ¯bpi
+
n−1,1 + (1− pµ¯b − p¯µb)pi
+
n1 + p¯µbpi
+
n+1,1, n = ne(0) + 2, ..., ne(1)− 1, (3.10)
pi+
ne(1),1
= pµ¯bpi
+
ne(1)−1,1
+ (1− pµ¯b − p¯µb)pi
+
ne(1),1
+ µbpi
+
ne(1)+1,1
, (3.11)
pi+
ne(1)+1,1
= pµ¯bpi
+
ne(1),1
+ µ¯bpi
+
ne(1)+1,1
. (3.12)
Define α = pµ¯b
p¯µb
< 1.
Taking into account (3.1)–(3.5), we first consider the probabilities {pi+n0|0 ≤ n ≤
ne(0) + 1}. From (3.1) we can get that
pi+00 =
p¯µν
p
pi+10 +
p¯µb
p
pi+11. (3.13)
Substituting (3.13) into (3.2), we obtain
(θ + θ¯pµ¯ν)pi
+
10 = p¯θ¯µbpi
+
11 + θ¯p¯µνpi
+
20. (3.14)
From (3.5) we get
pi+
ne(0)+1,0
=
pθ¯µ¯ν
1− θ¯µ¯ν
pi+
ne(0),0
. (3.15)
Substituting (3.15) into (3.4), we have
(θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν − θθ¯µ¯ν − θ¯
2µ¯2νp− θ¯
2µ¯νµν)pi
+
ne(0),0
− pθ¯µ¯ν(1− θ¯µ¯ν)pi
+
ne(0)−1,0
= 0.
(3.16)
From (3.3) we find that {pi+n0|1 ≤ n ≤ ne(0)} are the solutions of the following homoge-
neous linear difference equation with constant coefficients:
θ¯p¯µνxn+1 − (θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν)xn + θ¯pµ¯νxn−1 = 0, n = 2, 3, ..., ne(0)− 1. (3.17)
We investigate the corresponding characteristic equation
θ¯p¯µνx
2 − (θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν)x+ θ¯pµ¯ν = 0,
which has two roots
x∗1,2 =
(θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν)±
√
(θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν)2 − 4θ¯2pp¯µνµ¯ν
2θ¯p¯µν
. (3.18)
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The general solution of (3.17), denoted by xhomn , is x
hom
n = A˜1x
∗n
1 +B˜1x
∗n
2 (x
∗
1 6= x
∗
2), where
A˜1, B˜1 are the coefficients to be determined. From (3.14) and (3.16) we get the equations
about A˜1 and B˜1 as
(
θx∗1 + θ¯pµ¯νx
∗
1 − θ¯p¯µνx
∗2
1
)
A˜1 +
(
θx∗2 + θ¯pµ¯νx
∗
2 − θ¯p¯µνx
∗2
2
)
B˜1 = p¯θ¯µbpi
+
11,[(
θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν − θθ¯µ¯ν − θ¯
2µ¯2νp− θ¯
2µ¯νµν
)
x
ne(0)
1 − pθ¯µ¯ν
(
1− θ¯µ¯ν
)
x
ne(0)−1
1
]
A˜1
+
[(
θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν − θθ¯µ¯ν − θ¯
2µ¯2νp− θ¯
2µ¯νµν
)
x
ne(0)
2 − pθ¯µ¯ν
(
1− θ¯µ¯ν
)
x
ne(0)−1
2
]
B˜1 = 0.
(3.19)
Solving (3.19), we obtain
A˜1 =Hp¯θ¯µbpi
+
11
·
[
pθ¯µ¯ν
(
1− θ¯µ¯ν
)
x
∗ne(0)−1
2 −
(
θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν − θθ¯µ¯ν − θ¯
2µ¯2νp− θ¯
2µ¯νµν
)
x
∗ne(0)
2
]
,
B˜1 =Hp¯θ¯µbpi
+
11
·
[(
θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν − θθ¯µ¯ν − θ¯
2µ¯2νp− θ¯
2µ¯νµν
)
x
∗ne(0)
1 − pθ¯µ¯ν
(
1− θ¯µ¯ν
)
x
∗ne(0)−1
1
]
,
(3.20)
where
H =
{(
θx∗2 + θ¯pµ¯νx
∗
2 − θ¯p¯µνx
∗2
2
) [(
θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν − θθ¯µ¯ν − θ¯
2µ¯2νp− θ¯
2µ¯νµν
)
x
∗ne(0)
1
−pθ¯µ¯ν
(
1− θ¯µ¯ν
)
x
∗ne(0)−1
1
]
−
(
θx∗1 + θ¯pµ¯νx
∗
1 − θ¯p¯µνx
∗2
1
)
·
[(
θ + θ¯pµ¯ν + θ¯p¯µν − θθ¯µ¯ν − θ¯
2µ¯2νp− θ¯
2µ¯νµν
)
x
∗ne(0)
2 − pθ¯µ¯ν(1− θ¯µ¯ν)x
∗ne(0)−1
2
]}
−1
.
Thus, 
pi+00 =
p¯µν
p
(A˜1x
∗
1 + B˜1x
∗
2) +
p¯µb
p
pi+11,
pi+n0 = A˜1x
∗n
1 + B˜1x
∗n
2 , n = 1, 2, ..., ne(0),
pi+
ne(0)+1,0
=
pθ¯µ¯ν
1− θ¯µ¯ν
(A˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + B˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 ).
Next, we discuss the probabilities {pi+n1|1 ≤ n ≤ ne(0)}. From (3.7), {pi
+
n1|1 ≤ n ≤
ne(0)} are the solutions of the following nonhomogeneous linear difference equation:
p¯µbpi
+
n+1,1 − (pµ¯b + p¯µb)pi
+
n1 + pµ¯bpi
+
n−1,1 = −θpµ¯ν(A˜1x
∗n−1
1 + B˜1x
∗n−1
2 )
− θ(1− pµ¯ν − p¯µν)(A˜1x
∗n
1 + B˜1x
∗n
2 )− θp¯µν(A˜1x
∗n+1
1 + B˜1x
∗n+1
2 ),
n = 2, 3, ..., ne(0)− 1. (3.21)
The general solution of the homogeneous version of (3.21) is xhomn = A˜21
n+ B˜2α
n. So the
general solution of (3.21), denoted by xgenn , is given as x
gen
n = x
hom
n +x
spec
n , where x
spec
n is a
specific solution of (3.21). Because the nonhomogeneous part of (3.21) is geometric with
parameter x∗1 and x
∗
2, we consider a specific solution of the form x
spec
n = C˜1x
∗n
1 + D˜1x
∗n
2 .
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Substituting xspecn = C˜1x
∗n
1 + D˜1x
∗n
2 into (3.21), we get
C˜1 =
θA˜1[(x
∗
1 − 1)(p¯µνx
∗
1 − pµ¯ν) + x
∗
1]
(x∗1 − 1)(pµ¯b − p¯µbx
∗
1)
,
D˜1 =
θB˜1[(x
∗
2 − 1)(p¯µνx
∗
2 − pµ¯ν) + x
∗
2]
(1− x∗2)(p¯µbx
∗
2 − pµ¯b)
.
(3.22)
Hence, the general solution of (3.21) is given as
xgenn = A˜21
n + B˜2α
n + C˜1x
∗n
1 + D˜1x
∗n
2 , n = 1, 2, ..., ne(0),
where A˜2, B˜2 are to be determined. Taking into account (3.6), we get that
A˜2 + αB˜2 = pi
+
11 − C˜1x
∗
1 − D˜1x
∗
2,
p¯µb(A˜2 + B˜2α
2) = (pµ¯b + p¯µbθ¯)pi
+
11 − θ(1− pµ¯ν)(A˜1x
∗
1 + B˜1x
∗
2)
− θp¯µν(A˜1x
∗2
1 + B˜1x
∗2
2 )− p¯µb(C˜1x
∗2
1 + D˜1x
∗2
2 ).
(3.23)
Solving (3.23), we have A˜2 =
p¯µbθ¯pi
+
11
−p¯µb(C˜1x
∗2
1
+D˜1x∗22 −αC˜1x
∗
1
−αD˜1x
∗
2
)−θp¯µν(A˜1x∗21 +B˜1x
∗2
2
)−θ(1−pµ¯ν)(A˜1x∗1+B˜1x
∗
2
)
p¯µb(1−α)
,
B˜2 =
p¯µb(C˜1x
∗2
1
+D˜1x∗22 −C˜1x
∗
1
−D˜1x
∗
2
)+θp¯µν(A˜1x∗21 +B˜1x
∗2
2
)+θ(1−pµ¯ν)(A˜1x∗1+B˜1x
∗
2
)−(pµ¯b−p¯µbθ)pi
+
11
p¯µbα(1−α)
.
(3.24)
Thus,
pi+n1 = A˜2 + B˜2α
n + C˜1x
∗n
1 + D˜1x
∗n
2 , n = 1, 2, ..., ne(0).
Then we discuss the probabilities {pi+n1|ne(0) + 2 ≤ n ≤ ne(1) + 1}. From (3.10),
{pi+n1|ne(0) + 2 ≤ n ≤ ne(1)} are the solutions of the homogeneous version of (3.21),
i.e.,xhomn = A˜31
n + B˜3α
n, where A˜3, B˜3 are to be determined.
Substituting xhomn = A˜31
n + B˜3α
n into (3.11), we get that{
A˜3 = 0,
B˜3 = α
−1−ne(0)pi+
ne(0)+1,1
.
(3.25)
From (3.12), we obtain
pine(1)+1,1 = p¯α
ne(1)−ne(0)pi+
ne(0)+1,1
.
Thus, {
pi+n1 = B˜3α
n, n = ne(0) + 2, ne(0) + 3, ..., ne(1),
pi+
ne(1)+1,1
= p¯αne(1)−ne(0)pi+
ne(0)+1,1
.
Finally, we consider the probability pi+
ne(0)+1,1
.
From (3.9) we get
pi+
ne(0)+1,1
= α(A˜2+ B˜2α
ne(0)+ C˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + D˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 )+
pθµ¯ν
p¯µb(1− θ¯µ¯ν)
(A˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + B˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 ).
Thus,
pi+n1 = A˜2 + B˜2α
n + C˜1x
∗n
1 + D˜1x
∗n
2 , n = 1, 2, ..., ne(0),
pi+
ne(0)+1,1
= α(A˜2 + B˜2α
ne(0) + C˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + D˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 ) +
pθµ¯ν
p¯µb(1− θ¯µ¯ν)
(A˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + B˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 ),
pi+n1 = B˜3α
n, n = ne(0) + 2, ne(0) + 3, ..., ne(1),
pi+
ne(1)+1,1
= p¯αne(1)−ne(0)
[
α(A˜2 + B˜2α
ne(0)+1 + C˜1x
∗ne(0)+1
1 + D˜1x
∗ne(0)+1
2 )
+
pθµ¯ν
p¯µb(1− θ¯µ¯ν)
(A˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + B˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 )
]
.
In conclusion, we have expressed all stationary probabilities in terms of pi+11. The
remaining probability pi+11 can be solved by the normalization equation
∑ne(0)+1
n=0 pi
+
n0 +∑ne(1)+1
n=1 pi
+
n1 = 1, so we obtain the following theorem which provides all stationary prob-
abilities.
Theorem 3.1. Consider an observable Geo/Geo/1 queue with multiple working vocations,
in which all arriving customers follow the threshold policy (ne(0), ne(1)). If α < 1, the
stationary distribution {pi+nj|(n, j) ∈ Ωob} of (L
+, J) is
pi+00 =
p¯µν
p
(A˜1x
∗
1 + B˜1x
∗
2) +
p¯µb
p
pi+11, (3.26)
pi+n0 = A˜1x
∗n
1 + B˜1x
∗n
2 , n = 1, 2, ..., ne(0), (3.27)
pi+
ne(0)+1,0
=
pθ¯µ¯ν
1− θ¯µ¯ν
(A˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + B˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 ), (3.28)
pi+n1 = A˜2 + B˜2α
n + C˜1x
∗n
1 + D˜1x
∗n
2 , n = 1, 2, ..., ne(0), (3.29)
pi+
ne(0)+1,1
= α(A˜2 + B˜2α
ne(0) + C˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + D˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 ) +
pθµ¯ν
p¯µb(1− θ¯µ¯ν)
(A˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + B˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 ),
(3.30)
pi+n1 = B˜3α
n, n = ne(0) + 2, ne(0) + 3, ..., ne(1), (3.31)
pi+
ne(1)+1,1
= p¯αne(1)−ne(0)
[
α(A˜2 + B˜2α
ne(0)+1 + C˜1x
∗ne(0)+1
1 + D˜1x
∗ne(0)+1
2 ) (3.32)
+
pθµ¯ν
p¯µb(1− θ¯µ¯ν)
(A˜1x
∗ne(0)
1 + B˜1x
∗ne(0)
2 )
]
.
where x∗1, x
∗
2, A˜1, B˜1, C˜1, D˜1, A˜2, B˜2, B˜3 are given by (3.18), (3.20), (3.22), (3.24),
(3.25) respectively, and pi+11 can be derived by the normalization equation
∑ne(0)+1
n=0 pi
+
n0 +∑ne(1)+1
n=1 pi
+
n1 = 1.
According to Theorem 3.1, the probability of balking is equal to pi+
ne(0)+1,0
+ pi+
ne(1)+1,1
.
So the social benefit per time unit for the threshold policy (ne(0), ne(1)) can be calculated
as
Us(ne(0), ne(1)) = pR(1− pi
+
ne(0)+1,0
− pi+
ne(1)+1,1
)− C
ne(0)+1∑
n=1
npi+n0 +
ne(1)+1∑
n=1
npi+n1
 .
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Figure 3: Equilibrium social benefit for the observable systems with R = 10, C = 1, θ = 0.05, µν = 0.4,
µb = 0.8
When all customers follow the above equilibrium threshold strategy (ne(0), ne(1)), the
social benefit per time unit in equilibrium can be represented as Us(ne(0), ne(1)). Fig. 3
is concerned with the social benefit under the equilibrium threshold strategy. We can
observe that Us(ne(0), ne(1)) first increases, then decreases with respect to p.
Next, from the view of social optimization, denote the socially optimal threshold
strategy as (n∗(0), n∗(1)), which can be obtained by solving the unconstrained integer
programming maxUs(ne(0), ne(1)). Figure 4 compares the equilibrium threshold strategy
(ne(0), ne(1)) and the socially optimal threshold strategy (n
∗(0), n∗(1)) for the observable
systems. We get that ne(0) > n
∗(0) and ne(1) > n
∗(1), which shows that the individual
optimization deviates from the social optimization for the observable systems.
4. The partially observable queue
In this section, we study the partially observable case in which the arriving cus-
tomers only observe the state Jn of the server. Suppose that the customers’ decision
that whether to join or to balk upon their arrival can be indicated by a couple of joining
probabilities (q(0), q(1)) (0 ≤ q(j) ≤ 1, j = 0, 1), i.e., the arrival rate is p(j) = pq(j)
when the server is in state j, and their equilibrium mixed strategy is represented by
(qe(0), qe(1)). The process {(L
+
n , Jn), n > 0} conforms a Markov chain with state space
Ωpo = {(0, 0)}
⋃
{(k, j) : k > 1, j = 0, 1}. The transition rate diagram is described in
Figure 5.
Using the lexicographical ordering for the states, the transition probability matrix can
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Figure 4: Comparisons of equilibrium and socially optimal threshold strategies for the observable systems
with R = 10, C = 1, θ = 0.3, µν = 0.4, p = 0.5
be written as:
P =

B
′
0 C
′
0
B
′
1 A
′
1 C
′
1
B
′
2 A
′
1 C
′
1
B
′
2 A
′
1 C
′
1
. . .
. . .
. . .
 ,
where
B
′
0 = p(0), C
′
0 = [p(0)θ¯, p(0)θ], B
′
1 =
[
p(0)µν
p(1)µb
]
,
A
′
1 =
[
θ¯(1− p(0)µ¯ν − p(0)µν) θ(1− p(0)µ¯ν − p(0)µν)
0 1− p(1)µ¯b − p(1)µb
]
,
C
′
1 =
[
p(0)θ¯µ¯ν p(0)θµ¯ν
0 p(1)µ¯b
]
, B
′
2 =
[
p(0)θ¯µν p(0)θµν
0 p(1)µb
]
.
Due to the block tridiagonal structure of the transition probability matrix, (L+n , Jn) is
a quasi-birth-and-death chain. Setting α˜ = p(1)µ¯b
µbp(1)
< 1, let (L+, J) be the stationary limit
of (L+n , Jn) and its distribution is denoted as
pi+
′
kj = P{L
+ = k, J = j}, (k, j) ∈ Ωpo,
pi+
′
00 = pi
′
0, (pi
+′
k0 , pi
+′
k1) = pi
′
k.
Using the matrix-geometric solution method, we get that the rate matric R is the
minimal non-negative solution of the matrix quadratic equation:
R = R2B
′
2 +RA
′
1 +C
′
1. (4.1)
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Figure 5: Transition rate diagram for the partially observable queues
Lemma 4.1. If α˜ < 1, the equation (4.1) has the minimal non-negative solution
R =
[
r rθ
θ¯p(1)µb(1−r)
0 α˜
]
(4.2)
where
r =
1
2µνp(0)
[
β + p(0)µ¯ν + p(0)µν −
√
(β + p(0)µ¯ν + p(0)µν)2 − 4p(0)µνp(0)µ¯ν
]
, β = θθ¯−1,
and 0 < r < 1.
Proof. As A
′
1, C
′
1, B
′
2 are all upper-triangular matrices, R has the same form. Then we
can suppose that
R =
[
r11 r12
0 r22
]
.
Substituting A
′
1, C
′
1, B
′
2 into (4.1), we get the equations as follows:
r11 = p(0)µν θ¯r
2
11 + θ¯(1− p(0)µ¯ν − p(0)µν)r11 + p(0)θ¯µ¯ν ,
r12 = p(0)θµνr
2
11 + p(1)µbr11r12 + p(1)µbr12r22 + θ(1− p(0)µ¯ν − p(0)µν)r11
+ (1− p(1)µ¯b − p(1)µb)r12 + p(0)θµ¯ν,
r22 = p(1)µbr
2
22 + (1− p(1)µ¯b − p(1)µb)r22 + p(1)µ¯b.
(4.3)
The third equation of (4.3) has the minimal non-negative solution r22 = α˜ (the other root
is r22 = 1). The first equation of (4.3) can be written as:
p(0)µνr
2
11 − (β + p(0)µ¯ν + p(0)µν)r11 + p(0)µ¯ν = 0.
The root of the above equation is r11 = r, and 0 < r < 1 (the other root is greater than
1). Substituting r11 = r and r22 = α˜ into the second equation, we can get
r12 =
rθ
θ¯p(1)µb(1− r)
.

Besides, r satisfies rθ
θ(1−r)
= p(0)µ¯ν − rp(0)µν.
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Theorem 4.1. Consider a partially observable Geo/Geo/1 queue with multiple working
vocations, in which all arriving customers follow the mixed policy (q(0), q(1)). If α˜ < 1,
the stationary distribution {pi+
′
kj |(k, j) ∈ Ωpo} of (L
+, J) is
pi+
′
00 = K[θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r)],
pi+
′
k0 = Kp(0)θ¯(1− r)r
k−1, k ≥ 1,
pi+
′
k1 = K
p(0)θ
p(1)µb
k−1∑
j=0
rjα˜k−1−j, k ≥ 1,
(4.4)
where
K =
p(1)µb(1− r)(1− α˜)
p(1)µb(1− r)(1− α˜)[θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r) + p(0)θ¯] + p(0)θ
.
Proof. According to the matrix-geometric solution method in Tian et al. [20], we have
pi
′
k = (pi
+′
k0 , pi
+′
k1) = (pi
+′
10 , pi
+′
11 )R
k−1, k ≥ 1, (4.5)
and (pi+
′
00 , pi
+′
10 , pi
+′
11 ) satisfies the equations
(pi+
′
00 , pi
+′
10 , pi
+′
11 )B[R] = (pi
+′
00 , pi
+′
10 , pi
+′
11 ).
where
B[R] =
[
B
′
0 C
′
0
B
′
1 RB
′
2 +A
′
1
]
=
 p(0) p(0)θ¯ p(0)θp(0)µν θ¯(1− p(0)µν)− rθ1−r θ(1− p(0)µν) + rθ1−r
p(1)µb 0 1− p(1)µb
 .
Solving the above equations, we get
pi+
′
00 = p(0)pi
+′
00 + p(0)µνpi
+′
10 + p(1)µbpi
+′
11 ,
pi+
′
10 = p(0)θ¯pi
+′
00 +
[
θ¯(1− p(0)µν)−
rθ
1− r
]
pi+
′
10 ,
pi+
′
11 = p(0)θpi
+′
00 +
[
θ(1− p(0)µν) +
rθ
1− r
]
pi+
′
10 + (1− p(1)µb)pi
+′
11 .
Setting pi
′
0 = pi
+′
00 is a constant which can be determined by the normalization condition
pi
′
0e+ pi
′
1(I−R)
−1
e = 1.
Hence,
pi+
′
10 =
p(0)θ¯(1− r)
θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r)
pi+
′
00 ,
pi+
′
11 =
p(0)θ
p(1)µb[θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r)]
pi+
′
00 .
15
From (4.2), we have
Rk =
[
rk rθ
θ¯p(1)µb(1−r)
∑k−1
j=0 r
jα˜k−1−j
0 α˜k
]
, k ≥ 1.
Substituting pi
′
1 = (pi
+′
10 , pi
+′
11 ) and R
k−1 into (4.5), we obtain
pi
′
k = (pi
+′
k0 , pi
+′
k1)
=
pi+
′
00
θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r)
(
p(0)θ¯(1− r)rk−1,
p(0)θ
p(1)µb
k−1∑
j=0
rjα˜k−1−j
)
, k ≥ 1.
In the end, using the normalization condition
pi
′
0e + pi
′
1(I−R)
−1
e = 1,
we get
pi+
′
00 =
[θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r)]p(1)µb(1− r)(1− α˜)
p(1)µb(1− r)(1− α˜)[θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r) + p(0)θ¯] + p(0)θ
.
So we complete the proof. 
According to (4.4), we can calculate the probabilities that an arrival occurs in a regular
busy period and in a working vacation period respectively as follows:
P (J = 0) =
∞∑
k=0
pi+
′
k0 = K
(
θ
1− r
+ θ¯µν
)
, (4.6)
P (J = 1) =
∞∑
k=1
pi+
′
k1 =
Kp(0)θ
p(1)µb(1− α˜)(1− r)
. (4.7)
Then we can compute the conditional mean queue length in a working vacation period
and in a regular busy period respectively as follows:
E[L0] =
∑
∞
k=1 kpi
+′
k0∑
∞
k=0 pi
+′
k0
=
p(0)θ¯
θ + θ¯µν(1− r)
,
E[L1] =
∑
∞
k=1 kpi
+′
k1∑
∞
k=1 pi
+′
k1
=
1− rα˜
(1− α˜)(1− r)
.
As for the conditional mean sojourn time in regular busy period, we can similarly
consider two situations at state (k, 1) (k ≥ 1) with those in observable queues. So we get
the PGF of the customers’ sojourn time in regular busy period, denoted by W ∗1 (z).
W ∗1 (z) =
∞∑
k=1
pi+
′
k1
[
µb
(
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)k
+ µ¯b
(
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)k+1]
=
Kp(0)θµbz
p(1)(1− µ¯bz − µbα˜z)(1 − µ¯bz − µbrz)
.
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Hence, the PGF of the conditional sojourn time in regular busy period is
W1(z) =
W ∗1 (z)
P (J = 1)
=
µb
2z(1 − α˜)(1− r)
(1− µ¯bz − µbα˜z)(1 − µ¯bz − µbrz)
.
Then we obtain the conditional mean sojourn time of the customers in regular busy period
as
E[W1] = W
′
1(z)|z=1 =
1
µb(1− r)
+
µbα˜− µb + 1
µb(1− α˜)
.
As for the conditional mean sojourn time in working vacation period, we can similarly
consider two situations at state (k, 0) (k ≥ 0) with those in observable queues. So we get
the PGF of the customers’ sojourn time in working vacation period, denoted by W ∗0 (z).
W ∗0 (z) =
∞∑
k=1
pi+
′
k0µν
[
P (S(k)ν ≤ V )S
(k)
ν (z|S
(k)
ν ≤ V )
+
k−1∑
j=0
P (S(j)ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν )V (z|S
(j)
ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν )
(
µb
1− µ¯bz
)k−j]
+
∞∑
k=1
pi+
′
k0 µ¯ν
[
P (S(k+1)ν ≤ V )S
(k+1)
ν (z|S
(k+1)
ν ≤ V )
+
k∑
j=0
P (S(j)ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν )V (z|S
(j)
ν ≤ V < S
(j+1)
ν )
(
µb
1− µ¯bz
)k+1−j]
+ pi+
′
00
[
P (S(1)ν ≤ V )S
(1)
ν (z|S
(1)
ν ≤ V ) + P (S
(0)
ν ≤ V < S
(1)
ν )V (z|S
(0)
ν ≤ V < S
(1)
ν )
·
µb
1− µ¯bz
]
=
∞∑
k=1
pi+
′
k0µν
[(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)k
+
k−1∑
j=0
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)j (
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)k−j]
+
∞∑
k=1
pi+
′
k0 µ¯ν
[(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)k+1
+
k∑
j=0
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
)j (
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)k+1−j]
+ pi+
′
00
(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
+
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)
=
Kp(0)(1− r)µ2ν θ¯
2z
(1− µ¯ν θ¯z)(1 − µ¯ν θ¯z − µν θ¯rz)
+
Kp(0)(1− r)θθ¯µbz
(1− µ¯bz − µbrz)(1− µ¯ν θ¯z − µν θ¯rz)
(
µν +
µ¯ν
r
)
+K[θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r)]
(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
+
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)
.
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Hence, the PGF of the conditional sojourn time in working vacation period is
W0(z) =
W ∗0 (z)
P (J = 0)
=
1
θ
(1−r)
+ θ¯µν
{
p(0)(1− r)µ2ν θ¯
2z
(1− µ¯ν θ¯z)(1− µ¯ν θ¯z − µν θ¯rz)
+
p(0)(1− r)θθ¯µbz
(1− µ¯bz − µbrz)(1− µ¯ν θ¯z − µν θ¯rz)
·
(
µν +
µ¯ν
r
)
+ [θ + θ¯p(0)µν(1− r)]
(
µν θ¯z
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
+
θ
1− µ¯ν θ¯z
µbz
1− µ¯bz
)}
.
Then we obtain the conditional mean sojourn time of the customers in working vacation
period as
E[W0] = W
′
0(z)|z=1
=
p(0)(1− r)2µ2ν θ¯
2[µν(2− r)− µ
2
ν(1− r) + θ(2− θ)(1− µν)(1 + rµν − µν)]
(θ + µν − θµν)2(θ + µν − θµν − rµν + rθµν)3
+
p(0)θ¯θ[µν(1− r) + µb(1− r)(1 + rµν − µν) + θ(1 + rµν − µν)(1 + rµb − µb)]
µb(θ + µν − θµν − rµν + rθµν)3
+
[θ + p(0)θ¯µν(1− r)](θ + µb − θµb)(1− r)
µb(θ + µν − θµν)(θ + µν − µνr − µνθ + rµνθ)
.
Hence, the expected net benefit of a customer who joins the queueing system equals
U(0; q(0)) = R − C
{
p(0)(1− r)2µ2ν θ¯
2[µν(2− r)− µ
2
ν(1− r) + θ(2− θ)(1− µν)(1 + rµν − µν)]
(θ + µν − θµν)2(θ + µν − θµν − rµν + rθµν)3
+
p(0)θ¯θ[µν(1− r) + µb(1− r)(1 + rµν − µν) + θ(1 + rµν − µν)(1 + rµb − µb)]
µb(θ + µν − θµν − rµν + rθµν)3
+
[θ + p(0)θ¯µν(1− r)](θ + µb − θµb)(1− r)
µb(θ + µν − θµν)(θ + µν − µνr − µνθ + rµνθ)
}
,
U(1; q(0), q(1)) = R− C
[
1
µb(1− r)
+
µbα˜− µb + 1
µb(1− α˜)
]
.
Solving U(0; q(0)) = 0 and U(1; q(0), q(1)) = 0, we obtain the positive and feasible
roots (q∗e(0), q
∗
e(1)). Because the uniqueness of the roots in the partially observable
case, we present a set of numerical experiments to show the effect of the information
level. We get that the customers’ equilibrium mixed strategy (qe(0), qe(1)) is unique when
(qe(0), qe(1)) = (min{q
∗
e(0), 1}, min{q
∗
e(1), 1}) in the partially observable case.
From the Figure 6 we can obtain that despite the servers service rates have the relation
µb > µν , Figure 6 shows that qe(0) > qe(1). The reason for this phenomenon is that the
lower service rate µν in working vacation state can meet the customers’ service demand
when the waiting cost is low and the expected working vacation period is relatively short.
Next, we consider the equilibrium and maximal social benefit. Using theorem 4.1, we
can get the mean queue length
E[L] =
∞∑
k=0
kpi+
′
k0 +
∞∑
k=1
kpi+
′
k1 =
Kp(0)
1− r
[
θ¯ +
θ(1− rα˜)
p(1)µb(1− r)(1− α˜)2
]
.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium thresholds for the partially observable systems with different working vacation
parameter θ when R = 8, C = 3, µb = 0.8, µν = 0.4
So the social benefit per time unit for the mixed policy (q(0), q(1)) can be calculated as
Us(q(0), q(1)) = dR− CE[L]
= p(P (J = 0)q(0) + P (J = 1)q(1))R−
CKp(0)
1− r
[
θ¯ +
θ(1− rα˜)
p(1)µb(1− r)(1− α˜)2
]
.
where d = p(P (J = 0)q(0) + P (J = 1)q(1)) and P (J = 0), P (J = 1) are given by (4.6)
and (4.7).
When all customers follow the above equilibrium mixed strategy (qe(0), qe(1)), the
social benefit per time unit in equilibrium can be represented as Us(qe(0), qe(1)). Figure 7
is concerned with the social benefit under the equilibrium mixed strategy. We can observe
that Us(qe(0), qe(1)) first increases, then decreases with respect to p.
Next, from the view of social optimization, denote the socially optimal mixed strategy
as (q∗(0), q∗(1)), which can be obtained by differentiating Us(q(0), q(1)) with respect to
q(0) and q(1) and solving the equations. Figure 8 compares the equilibrium mixed strat-
egy (qe(0), qe(1)) and the socially optimal mixed strategy (q
∗(0), q∗(1)) for the partially
observable systems. We get that qe(0) > q
∗(0) and qe(1) > q
∗(1), which shows that the
individual optimization deviates from the social optimization for the partially observable
systems.
5. The unobservable queue
We finally investigate the unobservable case in which the arriving customers observe
neither the state Jn of the server nor the number of customers L
+
n in the system. Suppose
that the customers’ decision that whether to join or to balk upon their arrival can be
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Figure 7: Equilibrium social benefit for the partially observable systems with R = 10, C = 3, θ = 0.05,
µν = 0.5, µb = 0.9
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Figure 8: Comparisons of equilibrium and socially optimal mixed strategies for the partially observable
systems with R = 10, C = 3, θ = 0.05, µν = 0.5, µb = 0.9
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Figure 9: Transition rate diagram for the unobservable queues
indicated by a joining probability q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1), and their equilibrium mixed strategy
is represented by qe. The state space is Ωuo = {(0, 0)}
⋃
{(k, j) : k > 1, j = 0, 1}. The
transition rate diagram is described in Figure 9.
According to the decomposition result given in Tian et al. [20], we can obtain the
mean sojourn time of a joining customer as follows:
E[W ] =
1
µb(1− α
′)
+K∗δ2(pq)
−1(1− pqσ)
σ
1− σ
,
where
K∗ = [δ1(pq)
−1 + δ2(pq)
−1(1− pqσ)]−1,
δ1 = (pq)
2µ¯bθ¯µν
(1− r
′
)2
r′
, δ2 = pqθ¯(pq + r
′
pq)
1− r
′
r′
(µb − µν),
α
′
=
pqµ¯b
pqµb
, σ =
r
′
pq + r′pq
, 1− σ =
pq(1− r
′
)
pq + r′pq
,
and r
′
satisfies the equation pqµ¯ν − r
′
µνpq =
r
′
θ
θ(1−r′ )
.
Hence, the expected net benefit of the customer who joins the queueing system equals
U(q) = R− CE[W ]
= R− C
[
1
µb(1− α
′)
+K∗δ2(pq)
−1(1− pqσ)
σ
1− σ
]
.
Solving U(q) = 0, we obtain the positive and feasible root q∗e . Because the uniqueness of
the root in the unobservable case, we present a set of numerical experiments to show the
effect of the information level. We get that the customers’ equilibrium mixed strategy
qe is unique when qe = min{q
∗
e , 1} in the unobservable case. From the Figure 10 we
can observe that qe decreases with respect to p, and qe decreases faster when µb becomes
smaller.
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Figure 10: Equilibrium thresholds for the unobservable systems with different service parameter µb when
R = 4.5, C = 1, θ = 0.3, µν = 0.5
Next, we can get the social benefit per time unit for the mixed policy q as
Us(q) = pq(R− CE[W ])
= pq
[
R− C
(
1
µb(1− α
′)
+K∗δ2(pq)
−1(1− pqσ)
σ
1− σ
)]
.
When all customers follow the above equilibrium mixed strategy qe, the social benefit
per time unit in equilibrium can be represented as Us(qe). Figure 11 is concerned with
the social benefit under the equilibrium mixed strategy. We can observe that Us(qe) first
increases, then decreases with respect to p.
Next, from the view of social optimization, denote the socially optimal mixed strategy
as q∗ , which can be obtained by differentiating Us(q) with respect to q and solving the
equation. Figure 12 compares the equilibrium mixed strategy qe and the socially optimal
mixed strategy q∗ for the unobservable systems. We get that qe > q
∗, which shows that
the individual optimization deviates from the social optimization for the unobservable
systems.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have researched the equilibrium customer behavior in the discrete-time
Geo/Geo/1 queueing system with multiple working vacations in which arriving customers
decide whether to join or to balk the system. To the best of the authors’ knowledge,
it is the first time studying the discrete-time queueing systems with multiple working
vacations from an economic viewpoint. Three different cases with respect to the level
of information provided to arriving customers have been investigated extensively and the
equilibrium thresholds and social benefit for each case were derived. Furthermore, we have
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Figure 11: Equilibrium social benefit for the unobservable systems with R = 4.5, C = 1, θ = 0.3,
µν = 0.5, µb = 0.9
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Figure 12: Comparisons of equilibrium and socially optimal mixed strategies for the unobservable systems
with R = 4.5, C = 1, θ = 0.3, µν = 0.5, µb = 0.9
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presented some numerical experiments to research the effect of the information level on
the equilibrium behavior and to compare the customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal
strategies.
The focal point of this paper is on the equilibrium balking strategies’ analysis. There
are various aspects for future research. One can think of the equilibrium behavior under
single working vacation policy. Furthermore, we can also explore equilibrium behavior in
Geo/G/1 and GI/Geo/1 queueing systems with various vacation policies.
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